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always be considered in their relation to the living organism whose ideas they are. The authors, for example, explain the idea of property as depending upon the association between the idea of an object and that of an individual; they make no reference at all to the feelings which accompany personal possession. In the education of the idiot the question of the interests, the likes and dislikes of the individual, play an important rôle, to which the authors do not refer.

While the work is an interesting psychological analysis, it contributes little to our knowledge of the mental life of the idiot. There is no attempt made to discuss the imbecile in any detail.

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La proposition et le syllogisme. J. LACHELIER. *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*, March, 1906. Pp. 135-164.

The author distinguishes relative propositions from propositions of 'inherence,' such as 'Peter is a man' and 'all men are mortal' which 'analyze existence.' Both sorts of propositions give rise to syllogisms, but the laws of the former are said to be more akin to mathematics than to traditional logic. It seems to me, however, that from the standpoint of modern formal logic, if difference is to be made, quite the reverse is true with respect to their kinship to mathematics, for propositions of 'inherence' lend themselves readily to the operations of a calculus, while relative propositions do so only by elaborate particularizations and restrictions.

Propositions of 'inherence,' with which the paper is alone concerned, are of three distinct sorts, singular, general and collective. Our author thinks that general and collective propositions should always be sharply distinguished because the former, unlike the latter, do not depend upon a number of defined individuals. Collective propositions are 'determined' or 'undetermined,' for example, 'all the members of this family are well informed' and 'some of the members of this family are well informed.' General propositions are universal or particular, and they may also be understood in two senses: an abstract sense by which the quality 'man' implies the quality 'mortal,' and a concrete sense by which any being having the one quality has also the other. Formal logic has confused the relations of all but universals and particulars by treating singulars as universals and confusing collectives with generals.

As to the syllogism, there are three figures having the following relations: the first figure alone can prove a proposition of inherence, the second overthrows the minor of the first, and the third overthrows the major of the first. Keeping the five sorts of propositions in mind, the modes of the first two figures are ten each, but the third has fourteen modes. If in the first figure we substitute for the minor the contradiction of the conclusion, we demonstrate in the second figure the contradiction of the minor, and if we substitute for the major the contradiction of the conclusion, we demonstrate in the third figure the contradiction

of the major, and in this manner we can develop the ten modes of each figure symmetrically. The third figure with its fourteen modes introduces a slight asymmetry unless we extend the modes of the first two figures by weakened conclusions, which M. Lachelier rightly concludes is too high a price to pay for symmetry.

The paper may be of interest to those still delighting in the artificialities of syllogistic and unwilling to deal with them by the method of Mrs. Ladd-Franklin, which dooms such discussions of modes and figures by laying bare the real nature of the formal reasoning involved.

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JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS

ARCHIV FÜR SYSTEMATISCHE PHILOSOPHIE. February, 1906, Band 12, Heft 1. *Ueber Begriffe, Definitionen und mathematische Phantasie* (pp. 1-32): K. GEISSLER. - All proper definition rests on elements that can not be defined, but which do exist. Mathematicians who disregard this general principle either indulge in mere word-spinning or at least have an erroneous conception of their work. They introduce new elements into the web of demonstration without either defining them or making it clear whether their existence is real or imaginary. Like Kant they suppose the definitions of point, line, etc., to be independent of each other, and yet to permit of synthetic, *a priori* judgments. To be concluded. *De Voluntate* (pp. 33-54): B. LENCKE. - Our knowledge of the will is in part antecedent of all experiences, for the following axioms do not depend on experience; will always refers to some *thing*; in every will there are two kinds, desire and aversion; there is degree; and there is a will-zero, or indifference; will is a continuity of degree, not of parts; no change of degree in will occurs without a cause. Will itself must be known *a priori*. Will is a movement which is known only from one side. The law of desire is, the further an object is removed the greater is the possibility of desire for it. The law of aversion is that the nearer the object the greater the possibility of aversion. *Exakte Darstellung aller Urteile und Schlüsse* (pp. 55-58): HOFFMANN. *Bei welchen Tatsachen findet die wissenschaftliche Begründung der Erscheinung ihre Grenzen?* (pp. 59-65): R. SKALA. - *Hume's Theorie der Leichtglaubigkeit der Menschen und Kritik dieser Theorie* (pp. 66-83): B. WITICO. - The source of credulity is in childhood, preceding reflection. *Ueber Phantasiegefühle II.* (pp. 84-103): E. SCHWARTZ. - The joy of an event imagined springs not from the presence of the idea of that event, but from the judgment present that the event will occur. The intensity of 'fancy-feelings' varies according to four factors: the ideas that excite them, the 'earnest-feelings' to which they are related, the presence of a disposition to related earnest-feelings, and the emotional environment. *Die Metaphysik des XX Jahrhunderts als induktive Wissenschaft* (pp. 104-113): L. POHORILLES. - Transcendental realism clears the way for an inductive